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FORDHAMLAW REVIEW
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' ("the Guidelines") were designed to
control what has been referred to as "unwarranted disparity" in sentencing.
Before the Guidelines were instituted, judges sentenced essentially in their
discretion, and Congress believed-and, in some cases, clearly with good
reason-that this resulted in wildly different sentences for similarly situated
individuals. So the Guidelines were designed to control judicial discretion
by setting base offense levels for various categories of criminal conduct.
Once the base level and enhancements were put together with any
reductions that were found, the level that was reached was matched on an
axis with the defendant's criminal history. This process would lead to a
fairly small range of sentencing guidelines. The Guidelines allowed some
discretion to depart from the sentence reached on that grid, but departures
under the Guidelines were essentially for very unusual and very limited
circumstances, or where the government moved for a downward departure.
The Supreme Court invalidated this system of mandatory Guidelines in
January of 2005 in United States v. Booker.2 The Booker story began in a
case called Apprendi v. New Jersey.3 In Apprendi, the Court held that it
was unconstitutional for a defendant to be sentenced beyond the sentencing
range authorized by the legislature for a crime based on facts found by a
judge by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Apprendi Court reasoned that a defendant had a
constitutional expectation to be sentenced within the legislatively-
designated range for the crime charged and that his right to a jury trial and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be violated if the judge enhanced a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on facts found at sentencing
by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court in Booker held that the Apprendi rationale applied to the
Sentencing Guidelines as well, and that a sentence enhanced above the base
level would violate Apprendi because it would result from facts found by a
district judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the Guidelines'
enhancements were based on mandatory judicial fact-finding, the Booker
ruling had the potential to either scrap the whole or a large part of the
system or render these facts subject to jury determination, which would
basically mean trying to instruct juries on things like "more than minimal
planning" and "vulnerable victims," an arguably unworkable system. But
the remedial majority in Booker held that the constitutional solution was not
to invalidate the Guidelines as a whole but only to invalidate the Guidelines
insofar as they mandated enhancement on the basis of certain facts-in
other words, insofar as they were mandatory. So long as the Guidelines
were advisory, they did not violate Apprendi, because the defendant has no
expectation to be sentenced within a particular guideline if the Guidelines
are only advisory.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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The Court invalidated the statute that mandated Guideline application, 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). In place of mandatory Guidelines, the Court held that
while sentencing courts must consult the Guidelines, a sentence is to be
determined as well by the general factors of section 3553(a). Those factors
include the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, to provide
just punishment, to deter, to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
to consider everything and impose a sentence "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with [all of these factors]. ' '4 The sentences under
advisory Guidelines, according to Booker, are to be reviewed by the courts
of appeals to determine not whether they adhere to the Guidelines, but
whether they are reasonable.
This newfound discretion in sentencing under Booker raises a number of
important policy questions, probably the most important being how to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparity yet allow any kind of discretion in
sentencing. Courts are taking different approaches. There are
approximately ten district judges who have written what I would refer to as
challenging and influential opinions on how federal courts should approach
sentencing under advisory Guidelines. We have five of them on this panel.
In alphabetical order, from left to right:
Judge Lynn Adelman, Eastern District of Wisconsin, graduate of
Columbia Law School, appointed to the court in 1997 after serving twenty
years as a Wisconsin state senator.
Judge Nancy Gertner, District of Massachusetts, graduate of Yale Law
School, appointed to the court in 1994. Judge Gertner teaches a course on
sentencing at Yale and has written a number of influential law review
articles on the topic.
Judge Richard Kopf, District of Nebraska, a former Chief Judge of that
District, graduate of the University of Nebraska Law School, appointed to
the court in 1992 after serving five years as a magistrate judge.
Judge Gerard Lynch, Southern District of New York, a graduate of
Columbia Law School, appointed to the court in 2000. Judge Lynch was a
professor at Columbia for many years and also served in the U.S.
Attorney's Office of the Southern District, including as Chief of the
Criminal Division.
Judge Gregory Presnell, Middle District of Florida, graduate of the
University of Florida School of Law, appointed to the court in 2000 after
more than thirty years in private practice.
Our format tonight is to take short opening statements from the judges
and then to discuss some particular issues of controversy in sentencing after
Booker. I plan to open it up to questions and comments from the audience
at the end.
Judge Adelman.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
2006]
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JUDGE ADELMAN: Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here.
I thank Fordham Law School and Professor Capra. It is a particular
pleasure for me to be in New York City, which is where I got my first job
as a lawyer with the Legal Aid Society down at 100 Centre Street. I am
happy to be back here.
In these opening statements we were asked to say a few words about
Booker. For me, that is not hard to do. The system created by Booker is a
vast improvement over the mandatory Guidelines.
I got on the bench in 1997, and the Guidelines were in full swing by then.
I had practiced criminal law in the pre-Guidelines system, and I had a lot of
trouble with the mandatory Guidelines. I think the new system is much,
much fairer. In many cases, I think the sentences required by the
mandatory Guidelines were too harsh. The judge was prohibited from
considering many very important factors, like what kind of person the
defendant was or the motive for the crime. To some extent, I think those of
us who had been involved in sentencing under the Guidelines had gotten
used to this. But when you think about it from a little bit of a distance,
some of the things that you could not consider under the mandatory
Guidelines seem really shocking.
The sentencing hearing under the mandatory Guidelines made no sense
to the public or to the defendant. You did not talk about "moral culpability"
or any of the traditional things that are supposed to be part of sentencing,
such as the defendant's character, the reason that he offended, or the
likelihood that he would re-offend. Instead, you talked about how many
points on the grid a defendant should be assessed for some particular item.
In this respect and others, the mandatory Guidelines system was deeply
flawed.
Under Booker, however, the focus at sentencing is no longer the
Guidelines but section 3553(a), and, unlike the Guidelines, this statute
allows judges to consider everything that is important in sentencing a
defendant. Because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the
defendant's allocution and the lawyers' statements are meaningful. None of
that was true under the mandatory Guidelines. Sentencing under the
mandatory Guidelines was a rote process-the defendant would make a
statement and the lawyers would make statements, but they really did not
have anything to do with anything because the grid was God.
In my opinion, the system we have now, with Booker, is about as good as
we are going to get in the foreseeable future. But we have a lot of work to
do to preserve it, so anybody who is concerned about sentencing ought to
work very hard to preserve it. To me, that means making the case for the
present system. It means talking about how much better the system is and
why. In defending the new system, judges have too often made the
argument that, "Well, it is a good system because it is not that different;
everybody is still sentencing close to the Guidelines." I do not think that is
a winning argument. I do not think that you are going to win a debate by
saying "nothing has changed."
[Vol. 75
FEDERAL SENTENCING
A lot has changed-it should have changed-and we should say why the
change is good. I think that is an argument we have to make to Congress,
and we have to make it very strongly.
We also have to convince the courts of appeals that in reviewing
sentencing decisions for reasonableness, they are focusing too much on the
Guidelines and not enough on the other § 3553(a) factors or on the
parsimony provision. In addition, one avenue that Booker opens up is to
continue to talk about the flaws in the Guidelines. Even though the
Guidelines are not mandatory, they are still there, and a lot of people
overvalue them. I think we have to talk about what particular Guidelines
are based on, and often that is very little. Finally, I think district judges
have to work together to be comfortable with their new empowerment and
to improve sentencing practices.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Gertner.
JUDGE GERTNER: I want to start at the beginning here. I want to talk
a little bit about what the Guidelines system was supposed to be at the
outset, then how it went wrong.
In the Maine Law Review article that I wrote,5 I described how everyone
behaved badly. So first: How the Guidelines system went wrong, what
Booker contributes to salvaging the system, and how we are about to go
wrong again. I am much more of a pessimist than Judge Adelman.
What was the system at the outset? Because I teach this, I actually read
the statute, the legislative history, and every morsel of the material. The
elimination of disparity was not the only purpose of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Plainly, the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to look at
sentencing from top to bottom, listing all the purposes of sentencing that
were then extant-rehabilitation, retribution, and eliminating disparity. The
Sentencing Commission was supposed to be an expert body that would also
be a scientific body; it would look at recidivism studies and bring to bear
the best scientific wisdom that it could bring.
The result was not necessarily a system in which judges were to follow
Guidelines by rote, but a system where-if you understand that the initial
Guidelines were drafted in only a year; essentially it was a rough cut-there
would be departures if there was a factor of a kind or to a degree that had
not been adequately considered by the Commission. And, in a sense, there
was a feedback loop in which the judges, if they thought the Guidelines did
not fit the case at bar, would say so. The Commission would take that into
account, and there would be a continuing perfection of the Guidelines.
It did not happen that way. The Guidelines essentially supplanted
everything. It was almost as if we could no longer speak about anything
else, including the statute or the judicial role. We were only speaking about




the Guidelines and about compliance with the Guidelines, which were not
at all the terms in which the statute had begun.
The Commission made certain choices that in fact made the Guidelines
more rigid. It was almost as if, when there was an issue of judicial
discretion, the Commission opted for less. It created an enormously
complex grid, which gave the illusion of certainty and the reality of
something less. The Guidelines focused on quantitative measures rather
than the usual measures of sentencing, which is to say it mattered whether
the bank robber robbed $15,000 rather than doing exactly the same thing
but only robbing $5,000. They focused on criminal history and, to a large
degree, deemphasized-and in some cases discouraged-consideration of
personal characteristics.
The Guidelines themselves were not subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act. That is to say, you could never go into court and say, "You
know, this Guideline does not match the data on which the Commission
was basing it." You could only say, "The Guideline does not necessarily
apply in my case. I have a case outside the heartland."
Congress behaved badly. Congress created mandatory minimums, and
rather than give the Commission discretion, Congress directed the
Commission to change the Guidelines. Congress basically overstepped the
implicit boundaries in the Sentencing Reform Act.6 The appeals courts,
which could have interpreted departure authority broadly, did not; rather,
they narrowed departure authority. My personal favorite is when the First
Circuit reversed me in a case involving extraordinary family
circumstances. 7 Now, the statute says that the Commission was to consider
the extent to which family circumstances were relevant. The courts
interpreted that as "extraordinary family circumstances." The First Circuit
decided that the only person who can get a departure down in a case of
family circumstances is a person who was irreplaceable. I have two
teenaged sons; I am not irreplaceable-ask them. A single mother was not
irreplaceable because it was so common to be sentencing women offenders
who were single mothers.
The district court judges, I might add, for the most part did not interpret
the Guidelines but applied them as if they were the Tax Code. As Judge
Adelman said, sentencing, instead of being an occasion in which the moral
authority of the state is brought to bear on an individual, was an occasion on
which you said, "You are an offense level twelve, criminal history two, the
range is this," and virtually nothing else. Rather than encouraging judicial
creativity, the Guidelines did just the opposite. There was no feedback
loop. Over time, judicial departures were seen as lack of compliance with
the Guidelines.
6. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3551-3586 (2000).
7. United States v. Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1999), vacated and rev'd,
234 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Booker was an interesting moment in the sentencing story and should
have been a moment of creativity for all the players. Booker essentially
said that when the Guidelines had determinative consequences-in other
words, if I find $50,000, I am in this range-there was no discretion; there
was no moment in which I could look at the individual and say, "That might
be the range, but you are someone who does not need to be in that range
because of your past," whatever the characteristics were. Since it became
rote, with specific facts having determinative consequences, what I was
doing looked over time exactly like what the jury was doing. I think that is
really the core of Booker.
Justice Scalia had an interesting point, which is that, "I was doing what
the jury was doing, with few procedural safeguards. There are not the
safeguards of a jury trial."
So Booker was a moment of creativity. I love the description that Doug
Berman gave to the meaning of that moment. Quoting Ryan S. King and
Marc Mauer, he said that we have the possibility of "'rational jurisprudence
and thoughtful statutory interpretation,"' and that there is "'a new
methodology of judicial deliberation.' 8
There are now, as Professor Capra said, countless decisions on
sentencing, weighing and measuring and bringing into the public issues that
had heretofore not been discussed publicly. While I do not agree with
everything that everyone says, it is a discussion that seems critical, and the
courts of appeals are joining in that discussion.
The problem is that we are being measured in Congress and by the public
not by our creativity or our thoughtful decisions, but by whether or not this
system is promoting or undermining disparity. In other words, we are being
measured by compliance. We are being measured in precisely the terms
that one would have thought Booker jettisoned. As one judge in Oregon,
Michael Marcus, described it to me, it is as if the only thing we are talking
about is whether I am doing the same thing as Judge Adelman is doing,
even if we are both wrong.9 And, indeed, when you think about it, that is
the only measure.
Having said that, I understand the concern with disparity. There is really
a continuum here. On the one hand there were the mandatory Guidelines,
which Booker made unconstitutional insofar as a judge applied them. On
the other hand, there was what I like to describe as "free at last," which was
sort of a return to the pre-Guidelines moment. I believe that we are
somewhere in between. Another way to look at the continuum is there is
"free at last," then there are voluntary guidelines, presumptive guidelines,
8. Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,
43 Hous. L. Rev. 341, 351 (2006) (quoting Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing
Project, Sentencing with Discretion: Crack Cocaine Sentencing After Booker 20 (2006),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crackcocaine-afterbooker.pd).
9. For an overview of Judge Michael Marcus's views on sentencing, see Michael
Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety: What's Wrong and How We
Can Fix It, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 76 (2003).
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and mandatory guidelines. I think we are somewhere in the middle, which I
describe this way: We ought to be sentencing based on standards. It is past
the time when we can say, "Gee, I do not think this crime ought to be
treated as severely as Congress and the Commission have apparently
determined." We have to be talking about standards.
But the standards are not only the Guidelines. The Guidelines are one
source of standards; statutes provide another source. I argue for a common
law of sentencing, in which judges describe a set of standards, explain the
ways in which the Guidelines are imperfect, and come up with reasons.
The Commission should be promulgating standards based on studies about
recidivism and efficacy, not just about compliance-the kinds of studies
that I had hoped it would do in the beginning.
I had hoped that judges would interpret the Guidelines. There is a way in
which, as I said, it has become so rote. I was in the middle of writing an
article when Booker came down, that of course I had to throw out, that said
that what judges were doing was treating the Guidelines as if they were a
civil code. In a civil code system, you look at the book for an answer; you
believe that the statutes are comprehensive, that someone else has thought
through everything, and that all you have to do is figure out the meaning of
the words.
So we would have case law on what "extensive organization" meant,
which was mostly relying on Webster's Dictionary and not on legislative
history. There was no legislative history, for the most part, for the
Guidelines. What was the purpose behind "extensive organization" and
why are we making that a more culpable category? What does "vulnerable
victim" mean, and what kinds of people did the Commission have in mind?
Instead, judges are literally looking at it flat, looking only at the word,
and asking, "What does it mean?" I want judges to interpret the Guidelines.
I want the Guidelines departure authority to be interpreted in light of the
purposes of sentencing. In other words, I would like the First Circuit to
abandon the "irreplaceable" category and to say, "Why do we lighten
sentences when someone has a family situation that is compelling? Are we
concerned about the family? Are we concerned about the individual? What
did we have in mind?" I believe we would have a more consistent and a
more fair approach if we did that.
I want there to be common law standards, as I said. Common law
standards can evolve in the way judicial standards have evolved in every
other area of the law. There is a general rule, and you ask the question of
whether or not the general rule applies to the case in front of you: Does this
case fit the kind of case that the Guidelines drafters had in mind? Does this
case fit the heartland? There may have been reasons why the Commission,
for example, excluded age as a consideration in sentencing, and I can
understand that. Age sometimes points in the direction of recidivism, and
sometimes it excuses behavior. But I may have a case in which the vector
of age points in one direction. This is judicial thinking; this is thinking that
is informed by rules and standards.
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In addition, what Booker has done, which is magnificent, is to pay
attention to the procedures of sentencing. The procedures of sentencing
derive from a period of time when a judge could think about and listen to
anything. When sentencing was more like a clinical judgment, the judge
could consider anything. You would no more tell a doctor that he could not
consider a fact than you could tell a judge in those days that he could not
consider a fact. Anything came into the sentencing proceeding, subject to a
fair preponderance review. Yet, now the facts that I find in that sentencing
proceeding are going to have substantial consequences. So Booker has at
least alerted us to concerns about the burden of proof and about procedure.
Predicting doom and disaster, however, the Commission has issued
statistics which purport to show compliance and what the various district
courts and circuits are doing.' 0 It is as if the only question is how the most
accountable players are doing, but not all the other sources of disparity in
the system. The most accountable players have to be on the record, subject
to appeal. What the prosecutor does is not on the record, not subject to
appeal, and not subject to accessible guidelines. Yet, the focus is on
judicial disparity.
One interesting statistic: Sentencing length has not changed, even while
departures have gone up in some parts of the country. What does it mean?
It means that sentencing is a system in which judges and prosecutors
participate. Both players are working towards consistent ends; it is not just
the judges. But the sentencing lengths have remained the same. To focus
on judicial departures, then, is to suggest that this is really more about
symbolism, more about candidly criticizing the entity that everyone loves to
criticize, rather than talking about real efficacy or sentencing lengths.
The district courts have had a hard time getting out of-I think Berman
calls it-"the culture of compliance." In one sense, that is understandable.
The Guidelines anchored-that is really Judge Lynch's word-the way we
talked about and thought about guidelines. Most of the current bench never
existed in a pre-Guidelines world, so they define fairness by the Guidelines.
You do not have to do much to keep this group of people in line. They will
frame the sentencing in terms of the Guidelines. In fact, if you step back
and say that most of the bench now has been appointed by Republicans, and
if there are departures under Booker we ought to step back and say that
maybe they signify problems with the Guidelines rather than judges going
wild. You can see the TV news report: "Judges going wild."
Everything, in fact, militates in favor of the continuing significance of the
Guidelines. If there is flexibility, it is flexibility in areas where there ought
to have been flexibility. I have done a study of my own court. Most of the
departures are, for example, for the guy who has been in INS custody for
10. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Booker and Fanfan Materials,
http://www.ussc.gov/bf.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2006); see also United States Sentencing
Commission, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, District, and Circuit,
http://www.ussc.gov/LINKTOJP.HTM (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
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eight months and is going to be deported. Let us count that eight months as
part of the sentence; he was essentially in custody.
Many judges all across the country are looking at disparity between co-
defendants. We all have had the experience of winding up with three
people who have done essentially the same thing, but when you looked at
the column of figures you said, "Oh my God, why is he getting twenty
years and she is getting X?" So judges have been tweaking the Guidelines,
for the most part either following them and being totally compliant or
seeking flexibility in areas in which flexibility is deserved.
One last comment: A judge on my court, who was appointed by a
Republican and who was a prosecutor all his life, had a case called United
States v. Glavin.II The individual was born to a fourteen-year-old mother.
When he was eleven, she shot him up with heroin to keep him quiet.
Between eleven and twenty, he wound up with a series of small drug crimes
that for the most part never got him in state prison. Then he walked into a
bank and, with his finger in his pocket, stole $300. The Guidelines
mandated ten years. Judge Wolf decided to go down to seven or eight.
The departures have not been substantial, which is why sentencing
lengths have stayed the same. But Booker is a moment of creativity. If we
can leave sentencing as this, rather than what is now being proposed in the
legislature or what we believe will be proposed in the legislature, which is
doing something to "get those darn judges in line."
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Kopf?
JUDGE KOPF: If you have had the pleasure of reading these four
judges' opinions, as I have, you know that I am here as the goat. My job is
to attract the predators, and then you get to watch them kill me.
[Laughter]
I want to thank Professor Capra for inviting me. It is truly an honor. It is
especially flattering to be associated with Judges Adelman, Gertner, Lynch,
and Presnell. They are superb judges-I mean this sincerely-and I am
sure that I will learn a lot from them this evening.
Second, and by way of context, I am from the hinterlands. Despite that, I
sentenced 240 people in 2005. The average federal district judge sentences
roughly one hundred.
The majority of the sentences that I imposed in the District of Nebraska
were for drug offenses. As a result of these 240 people that I had to face
and pronounce sentences on, my thoughts about Booker are forged from a
heavy diet of criminal cases, generating, as Judge Gertner suggested, some
God-awfully long prison sentences. Put another way, it is quite possible
that my views about Booker are wrong. If that is so, I have lots of
experience committing reversible error.
11. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 35-46, United States v. Glavin, No. 04-10093
(D. Mass. Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
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I can express my thoughts regarding Booker in five fairly short points.
Point one: In my opinion, the overarching significance of the remedial
opinion in Booker is that it forces federal judges to consciously decide how
properly to exercise discretion in a democratic society. Starkly put, if the
choice is between a skinny or a muscular judicial role, I pick the weak one.
Point two-and here I think Judge Gertner and I will have a significant
disagreement about what the facts are: As I look at the facts, I do not think
one can objectively examine the history of the Guidelines and honestly
conclude that Congress thinks the Guidelines conflict with the statutes that
Congress wrote. It is far more consistent with an honest reading of the
record, in my opinion, to conclude that the Guidelines truly express
Congress's view about how best to achieve the statutory goals of
sentencing. By this, I do not mean to suggest that Congress is right or that I
agree with Congress. I mean only that the Guidelines, like administrative
regulations in other contexts, are most often an accurate expression of what
Congress wants.
Point three: Deference to the will of Congress as expressed in the
Guidelines is not antithetical to the exercise of judicial discretion as
mandated by Booker. Booker did mandate the exercise of judicial
discretion. However, deference means that absent a plainly superior and
principled reason for doing something different, a judge should freely
choose to exercise his or her judicial discretion in a way that is consistent
with the Guidelines. This is so even though it may be reasonable in a world
without the Guidelines to do something different. As between two rational
choices, one can properly exercise discretion under Booker by adopting the
choice that Congress has endorsed via the Guidelines. That is why several
circuit courts have now held that, post-Booker, a sentence within the
Guidelines is presumptively reasonable.
Point four: Unless there is an obviously superior reason for selecting a
non-Guidelines sentence in a particular case-and I acknowledge that there
are such cases-the Guidelines' sentence is the only proper choice.
Here, I noticed Judge Gertner's reference to Judge Wolf's decision to
impose a seven-year sentence rather than a ten-year sentence. You can
articulate a rationale for the seven-year sentence, but you are articulating a
rationale for the seven-year sentence that is different than the rationale that,
in my opinion, Congress approved. Unless you are able to put together a
theoretically coherent explanation that is going to apply not only in the
seven-year case in Boston, but also in Wisconsin, Nebraska, New York, and
California, then I wonder what you are doing.
The final point is this: I do not have a lot of confidence in district judges.
I have a lot of confidence in their ethics and their hard work. I have no
confidence in their ability to put together a coherent, analytical sentencing
method. We simply lack the institutional and personal competence to do
that. Because of that, and if for no other reason, we ought to give the
Guidelines heavy or substantial weight when we sentence.
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With that, once again, and hoping that I play the goat to everyone's
satisfaction, it is a pleasure being here.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Presnell
JUDGE PRESNELL: Thank you. It is great to be here. I always enjoy
coming to New York, although I feel a bit like a fish swimming upstream,
as most people at this time of year, given their choice, would be going from
New York to Florida rather than vice versa. Also, I was hopeful that I was
going to go last so that everything meaningful would have been said.
First, let me make a disclaimer: I am not a Guidelines expert. If you
have seen the Guidelines, they are like a fairly good-sized phone book. I
was a civil trial lawyer for thirty-two years, so when I came on the federal
bench I had no earthly idea what the Guidelines were like. But I dutifully
tried to learn and apply the Guidelines, thinking that there was a coherent
and reasonable rationale for why I was doing so.
After sentencing hundreds of people over the course of the last five years,
before Booker, it occurred to me that I was not needed in the process. I felt
like I was a meaningless figurehead in the administration of justice when it
came to criminal sentencing. As my colleagues have said, unless there was
a scoring dispute, pre-Booker I had virtually no discretion to consider
anything except to impose a Guidelines sentence.
Mothers would come in, crying, talking about why their child had gone
wrong, that it was their fault, and to please have mercy. I would listen to
that, and I would have to tell her, "Frankly, Ma'am, mercy is not a concept I
am allowed to consider." I mean that is a bold statement, but it is true. If I
departed because I felt, as a matter of subjective judgment, that mercy
required it, the Eleventh Circuit would have reversed me in a heartbeat-
and pre-Booker, it was pretty good at that.
The issue now, of course, is this: With the discretion that we have, how
much discretion are we going to be given? The only thing we are working
with is the notion of reasonableness; that is, is the sentence we impose
reasonable? We consult the Guidelines, we look at the other factors, and
we impose a sentence. Now, post-Booker, I write more sentencing opinions
than I used to because I think it is important that I explain my rationale for
why I think a sentence in a particular case is appropriate.
Thus far, the Eleventh Circuit has confirmed several below-Guidelines
sentences, including one of mine; and another one of mine, the Williams 12
opinion, is scheduled for oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit in May.
What I want to talk about briefly is something else that I have discussed
in my opinions. It relates to the post-Booker attitude of the Executive
Branch of our government. Post-Booker we are supposed to have
discretion. The Supreme Court says that the Guidelines are not mandatory,
but the Department of Justice, through written memoranda and the conduct
12. United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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and policies that have been exhibited by the Assistant United States
Attorneys, are still taking the position that the Guidelines are mandatory.
It may be different in other parts of the country, but in the Middle District
of Florida, if I impose a sentence below the Guidelines, after we have done
the scoring and everything, and I say, "I have considered the Guidelines, I
give deference to the Guidelines, but considering these other factors I think
a lower sentence is appropriate," the government routinely stands up and
says, "Your Honor, for the record I object."
Being a bit feisty, I will say, "Well, what is the basis for your objection?"
The response will be, "Well, it is not a Guidelines sentence."
I will say, "Well, it does not have to be a Guidelines sentence. What
factual basis do you have on the record to say that the § 3553(a) factors that
I considered result in an unreasonable sentence?"
The Government does not have any factual basis except that it is a non-
Guidelines sentence. Its rationale is that it is concerned about sentencing
disparity and the need for sentencing uniformity.
I have written in my opinions, however, that I think that these concerns
are plainly disingenuous because the Government is only concerned about
below-Guidelines sentences. If I go above the Guidelines' sentence, the
Government is happy; it does not care about that. And I have issued above-
Guidelines sentences as well as below-Guidelines sentences.
The other thing that I find interesting-and I am the only district judge
who either finds it interesting or dares to talk about it-is the reporting
requirements that the Department of Justice has come up with. District
judges who get out of line are reported on a Booker form. After Booker, the
Justice Department came out with a policy that told all of the United States
Attorneys that, "If you have any judges in your district who give a sentence
below the Guidelines, you have to fill out this form." On the form they talk
about what the U.S. Attorney thinks was my reason for the sentence. The
form also says that they are going to use this information in the policy
debate regarding sentencing legislation. It is clear that they are collecting
these statistics and giving what they think I am doing as a basis for the
public debate.
So I asked for a copy of my Booker forms. That request created great
consternation and, I am sure, several e-mails between Washington and
Orlando. The result was that they respectfully declined to give me those
forms. Not to be deterred, I filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request.
[Applause]
The FOIA statute gives them six weeks to respond. I mean if we are
going to have a public debate, let us make it transparent. And if anybody
knows whether the rationale I gave was my rationale, you would think it
would be me.
Well, it took the government four months to reply to my FOIA request.
You could see that the reason for the delay was the terribly insightful
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analysis they gave in their two-word response: "Request denied." I have
appealed that denial. It is now somewhere in the dark hole of some
administrative appeal division in the Department of Justice.
There is some levity in this, but I think there are some real implications
here on the independence of the judiciary. If you think about it, what really
is going on here is a political power struggle. The Executive Branch does
not want the judges to have a meaningful role in sentencing because, pre-
Booker, the government investigated the crime, they charged the crime,
they prosecuted the crime, and they sentenced. Judges had no meaningful
role. That power has now been taken away from the Executive Branch, and
it is resisting.
Alexis de Tocqueville said there were two things critical for the survival
of this new form of government: a free and vibrant press and an
independent judiciary. I think the independence of the judiciary is under
attack, and I think Booker and post-Booker development of the law has
profound implications with respect to the independence of our judiciary.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Lynch.
JUDGE LYNCH: I am so glad that Judge Kopf is here because
otherwise I would probably be the right wing of this panel and that would
creep me out.
[Laughter]
I want to focus my comments on four key words.
First word: guidelines. I am for guidelines. I have been for guidelines
since I was a law student and read Marvin Frankel's book. 13
It is important to go back and think about what sentencing was like
before the Guidelines in the federal system. In the Southern District of
New York, we had an institution called Part One. Part One was the place
you went to be arraigned when you were indicted. There was a particular
judge assigned each week to be in Part One. The rules for the division of
business were that if you pled not guilty, your case would be assigned at
random to some other judge. If you pled guilty, the Part One judge would
hear your plea and then sentence you later. When some judges were in Part
One, the line to plead guilty was out the door, down Duane Street, over to
Broadway, and back up halfway to Fordham. When other judges were
there, no one pled guilty. And if that same judge's name happened to come
at random out of the wheel, the judge would give a little smile, and the
defense lawyer's heart would sink. That is not the way things should be.
Frankly, I do not know that the reason for those differences between
judges was that the judges had radically different views about which crimes
were worse. I think the problem really was that judges had very different
ideas about what constituted a severe or lenient sentence. For one judge a
lenient sentence for a particular crime might be five years and a tough one
13. Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973).
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ten, while for the judge down the hall leniency might be probation and
severity five years. We needed guideposts. So I am for guidelines.
On the other hand, "guidelines" does not mean rigid mandates. This
brings me to the second key word: disparity. But what does "disparity" in
sentencing mean? It is a very slippery word.
I think it is a good thing for people to be consistent. It is wrong for a
defendant to go to jail for ten years because he happens to have his case
assigned to me, when he would go to jail for five years if the same case
were assigned to the judge next door. That is not the way things should be.
We all understand that, and we all want some system that will help to make
sentencing more consistent.
But what does "disparity" mean? It means treating like cases unlike, but
it also means treating unlike cases alike. That is a piece of the problem that
we have not heard discussed much. After all, we could have absolutely
uniform sentencing in this country. It would only take one law. The law
would say "anyone who is convicted of a crime shall go to jail for five
years. It does not matter if it is murder or rape, it does not matter if it is a
misdemeanor, it does not matter if it is spitting on the sidewalk--every
criminal goes to jail for five years." We would have total even-handedness;
everyone would get the same sentence. It would not matter what judge you
went before. But obviously, that would not be justice because those cases
are different. Murderers should go to jail for longer than people who spit
on the sidewalk.
As we think about disparity, we have to be aware of the problem that we
are trying to treat like cases alike, while also trying to make meaningful and
relevant distinctions between cases. This is where it gets complicated.
The Guidelines book, as you were told, becomes the size of a phone
book. That is because if you try to foresee every wrinkle that could
possibly affect how severely criminals should be treated, you are going to
get not one phone book but two, not two but three.
Even if we have that feedback loop that Judge Gertner referred to, that
still will not solve the problem because the idea of departures as feedback to
the Sentencing Commission aims at the unattainable ideal of the
Guidelines' perfection. If a sentencing judge identified a factor not listed in
the Guidelines that indicated a difference between one case and another, the
thing to do was to write that factor into the Guidelines. Then, if another
judge comes up with another wrinkle, we will write that into the Guidelines,
too. We will try to capture all of human diversity, all the varieties of human
evil, all the varieties of human sorrow, into a code that will somehow
mathematically cover everything. I think it cannot be done. I think there
will always be differences that cannot be captured by such a calculus. Then
we have to worry whether we are creating disparity by treating the unlike
alike, by failing to consider all the things that ought to be considered.
I want to talk about a third word today: compliance. We are going to
hear a lot, I suspect, in the upcoming debate about compliance with the
Guidelines.
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But "compliance" is almost as slippery a word as "disparity." The
Sentencing Commission has compiled a lot of statistics about sentencing
after Booker, and there is a great article in the Houston Law Review by
Frank Bowman that analyzes all of these statistics. 14  One question
Bowman addresses is what he calls the extent of judges' "compliance" with
the Guidelines. But the one objection I had to Bowman-and I tried to
persuade him to use a different word-is that the word "compliance" is a
very bad word because it suggests disobedience. The idea is that if a
sentence is within the Guidelines, it is a compliant sentence; if the sentence
is given outside the Guidelines, for whatever reason, it is a noncompliant
sentence. That is a mistake for a number of reasons.
One mistake is something Nancy referred to earlier: The Guidelines
themselves, and the Sentencing Reform Act itself, contemplate departures.
To depart is not to be noncompliant; to depart is to say that there is a fact
about this case that is important to sentencing and that the Guidelines do not
adequately take into account. An outside-the-Guidelines sentence is
sometimes entirely compliant with the Guidelines, because the Guidelines
themselves authorize various departures. Also, after Booker, even a
sentence that is outside the Guidelines system is fully compliant with the
law, because § 3553(a) makes the Guidelines only one factor to consider in
imposing a sentence. So it is not noncompliant to be outside the
Guidelines.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible for a sentence within the
Guidelines to be noncompliant, because the judge herself, whose
compliance is being measured, calculated the applicable Guidelines range.
If you are doing the job honestly, you are trying to interpret the Guidelines,
as Nancy puts it, in a way that is consistent with their purposes. But not
everyone does that. It is not only judges; prosecutors and defense lawyers
can get together and create a Guidelines outcome. A sentence that is within
a Guidelines range that results from manipulated Guidelines calculations
will register statistically as a "compliant" sentence, when in fact it is not.
Often, in perfect good faith, I can impose a sentence in two different
ways. I can say, "You know, I read this guideline this way and I am going
to take two points off because I do not think this guideline applies." If, as a
result of that, I give a particular sentence within that newly configured
Guidelines range, it counts as compliant. But if instead I decide, "You
know, it is a close call, but I think really the Guideline should be interpreted
the other way and he gets the two points; but when I look at all the factors, I
think the sentence should be a little lower," the same answer, the same
bottom line, will be considered noncompliant.
14. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee... Or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 Hous.
L. Rev. 279 (2006).
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Watch your wallet when people talk about disparity. Watch your wallet
when people talk about compliance. Look behind that talk and try to figure
out what they are really talking about.
The fourth word I want to talk about is "presumption." Here is where I
think I differ from Judge Kopf, because I do not think it is a good idea to
talk about hard presumptions. I do think, though, that if we are playing the
game fairly, if we are trying to do what Congress mandates, then most
sentences will and should be within the Guidelines. Congress, after all, gets
to make the law, that is their power; the Executive has to follow that when
it may not like it, and the Judiciary has to follow that when it may not like
it.
That does not mean, however, that there should be a presumption in favor
of the Guidelines sentence. That is not what the Supreme Court said in
Booker, and it is not what the statute says, at least once you excise the part
that the Supreme Court excised. The statute says to look at all of these
factors and impose the lowest sentence necessary to accomplish these goals,
only one of which is consideration of the Guidelines recommendations.
Nevertheless, I want to talk about a psychological and a legal
phenomenon that I think will and should lead most judges to stay close to
the Guidelines.
The psychological fact is that there is in social science literature a
concept called "anchoring." Some folks have done an experiment where
they take three control groups, perfectly matched people in all relevant
respects, and give them each a bottle of the same wine.
They say to the first group, "We are going to market this wine and we
would like your opinion as consumers. We would like to know what you
think of this wine. The way we want you to express your opinion is to tell
us how much you would pay for this bottle if you went into a liquor store
and bought this wine." The subjects all give different answers because no
one knows. Everybody pretends they have taste, but nobody really knows.
So the experimenters get a whole lot of different answers. They take an
average, and the average comes out to $10.
Meanwhile, they take a second group and give that group the same bottle
of wine and set the same problem, except they say, "We are going to market
this wine. We are thinking of marketing this for $50 a bottle. You tell us
what you would pay." Everybody expresses their opinion. When the
experimenters average the amounts, it comes out to $20; it no longer comes
out to $10.
Then they take the third group and say, "We are thinking of marketing
mass quantities of this wine. We are going to sell this for five dollars a
bottle, but we would like to know what you would pay." And, sure enough,
what was a $10 bottle of wine now comes down to $6 or $7.50 or
something.
That is what anchoring means: When you have a question that is very
subjective that people are called upon to answer and you give them a
number as a kind of baseline, that number is very helpful. Whether people
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like that number or not, even if they are angry about that number, does not
matter; they will still be influenced by that number. That is the
psychological fact. I think it is psychologically inevitable that the
Guidelines will have a powerful influence on sentences, even if they are
purely advisory, because they put a number on a question that is otherwise
quite subjective.
There is also a legal fact. If you look at the factors in § 3553(a), first, the
Guidelines recommendation itself is a factor in its own right. Second,
avoiding disparity is a factor. As I said, avoiding disparity can be a very
complicated thing, and, in my opinion, often you avoid disparity by not
following the Guidelines. But more often, if we all follow the Guidelines,
there will be less disparity. That is a factor that will often cut in favor of
following the Guidelines. Third, the need for just punishment is a factor,
and the need to deter crimes is a factor. Of course, we all have our opinions
about what kind of sentence is necessary in order to impose just
punishment.
Let me tell you something about the way sentencing works. We judges
sit in a room and we see the facts. That is something that drives us in
sentencing. We see the particular cases. We see the sorrowful mothers, not
only of the defendants but also of the victims. We see the people who lost
their life savings. We see the people with horrible lives that led them into a
life of crime and brought them before the bar of justice. We see all the
messed-up stuff that happens in particular cases. We see the intensity with
which one case differs from another case, and that is something that drives
us, and I think it should drive us. I think it is wrong for the law to ignore
those factors.
On the other hand, even if we have a unique perspective that Congress
lacks, it is a limited perspective. I agree with Judge Kopf about this. It is
not just that we do not have a mechanism for taking the broad view; I think
we are psychologically incapacitated from taking the broad view. We are
looking at grief when we impose sentences. We have a hard time-I have a
hard time-looking at these people and inflicting pain on them, which is
what I am asked to do. By the same token, we have all the facts about the
victims as well and that will push us in the opposite direction. But what we
do not have is the overview, the policy perspective, and that is an important
perspective to have.
A little digression: Let me bring it back to § 3553(a). I think that I am in
a very good position to assess some facts, that I am in a better position to
assess those facts than the Sentencing Commission or even the
democratically elected members of Congress. When we are asked to
consider in § 3553(a) the particular characteristics of an individual-when
we are asked to consider whether this person is a threat to society or
whether this person is in need of rehabilitation and, if so, how much-I




On the other hand, it helps to have a broader view when the questions
are, "what does society need as a whole? and are these sentences for drug
cases, which seem outrageously severe to me, really necessary?" it helps to
have a broader view. Of course, I have my own opinions on that, and like
everybody else, I think my view is right and yours is wrong; I think mine is
right and Congress's is wrong. But I am just one citizen. If Congress
thinks that I am wrong, if a majority of the people think that I am wrong,
then I think they are in a better position than I am to set that social policy.
As a citizen, I may not like the general assumption that we are going to
be tough on drugs. Well, I get to vote. If other people vote for the guys
who think this is good public policy, well guess what? It is a democracy.
They win.
What conduct is necessary to deter? I agree with Judge Gertner, the
Commission does a terrible job of what they could, in an ideal world, do a
wonderful job of doing real studies about what works with deterrence and
who needs to be incapacitated. Whether the Commission does a good job
or a bad job, it is entrusted with that job. The result is that the factors of
punishment and deterrence will favor imposition of a Guidelines sentence
in most cases.
I think several of the factors mandated by the statute will and should lean
us towards the Guidelines. I do not think I would like to see appellate
courts turn that into a hard presumption, but I think the cumulative effect of
those factors is that we are likely to stick with the Guidelines. Moreover,
because of the anchoring phenomenon, I think we are also likely not to
deviate that much when we do deviate. When you look at these studies of
judicial "compliance" with the Guidelines after Booker, one question to ask
(which is rarely asked) is, what is the extent of the departure?
I suspect that after Booker, life is better for judges in most respects. But
it is not better in one way: It is much more painful to impose sentences.
You can not hide behind the Guidelines anymore. You can not say to the
grieving mother, "Sorry, mercy is not in my vocabulary. Congress has
forbidden me to consider it." You have to say, "In this case your kid has to
go to jail for the good of society. I am not going to exercise mercy, that is
my call, and I am making it." That is a painful thing for judges.
On the other hand, nobody likes to be a potted plant, in Brendan
Sullivan's famous term.15 Nobody likes to be someone who is sitting there
as a figurehead. People want to feel that they are doing justice. That is
why we are doing this instead of getting paid the big bucks somewhere else.
So it is better for us to have that discretion.
But is it better for defendants? I am not sure it will be, at least by very
much, because I suspect that for all of the reasons I have suggested, the
extent of departures is not going to be that great. If the general public
policy is "get tough on crime," judges will be enlisted to execute that policy
15. See Behind the Accusatory Outbursts, Sullivan Has a Protective Purpose, Wash.
Post, July 10, 1987, at A14.
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and they will follow that policy. They may trim it around the edges; they
may save some poor devils who are particularly sympathetic from the
fullest rigors of that system. But Booker does not represent the day of
jubilee for defendants and defense lawyers, and, for a variety of reasons, I
do not think it is or should be for judges either.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I would like to open it up now, if any of the
panelists want to comment on what has gone before.
Judge Adelman, since you went first, do you have any reactions you want
to speak of? Otherwise, I will direct specific questions.
JUDGE ADELMAN: I think it is interesting that even though there are
different emphases among the judges, what I think I heard correctly is that
everybody likes Booker a lot better than the mandatory Guidelines system.
I think that is significant because probably over the next year or so, maybe
sooner, we will face possible threats to Booker. So I think that is a
significant fact.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Gertner.
JUDGE GERTNER: I want to respond to Judge Kopf for a moment.
Congress does not sentence an individual; Congress sets the broad social
policy. As Judge Lynch said, the broad social policy, particularly with
respect to drugs, is drawing everyone's sentences up from where they
would otherwise be. The sentence by Judge Wolf I described earlier went
from ten years to eight. If given full discretion, he would have chosen two
or one. But clearly, Congress's social policy is being implemented.
The Guidelines drafters recognized that it is difficult to prescribe a single
set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct
particularly relevant to a sentencing decision. The Commission recognizes
that circumstances that may warrant departure from the Guidelines range
cannot be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.
There is a difference between broad social policy and individuals.
Having said that, I agree with Judge Kopf that we need to develop
principled means of distinguishing between one defendant and all the others
under the Guidelines. We do that in every other aspect of our work. We
come up with principled distinctions. We create common law rules. The
court of appeals either thinks they are good or does not think they are good.
We have begun to exchange sentencing information in my court so that I
can hear the basis for Judge Wolf's sentence and I can decide whether it
applies in my case. From that will come additional rules and standards, just
as they evolve in everything else we do.
And finally, if the Guidelines are what Congress wants and that is why
we should interpret them, then we have a serious separation of powers issue
here. The Sentencing Commission is in the Judicial Branch. The
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Sentencing Commission was intended not to be, as Justice Scalia described
it, a "junior-varsity Congress." 16
JUDGE KOPF: In dissent.
JUDGE GERTNER: Yes, in dissent.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Eight to one.
JUDGE GERTNER: Yes. But he is now going to be in the majority, so
it should not be a one-to-one correlation between the Commission and
Congress.
JUDGE KOPF: It is interesting for Judge Gertner to speak for Justice
Scalia.
JUDGE GERTNER: Yes, it is.
JUDGE KOPF: It makes me tingle.
[Laughter]
JUDGE GERTNER: We are onboard on this one.
But, seriously, the Mistretta17 Court based its decision regarding the
sentencing system on the fact that the Sentencing Commission was in the
Judicial Branch. The setup of the statute implied that the Sentencing
Commission would do that which Congress could not do, which was look at
the minutiae of sentencing and come up with standards and guidelines. It is
not a one-to-one correlation between what Congress wants and the
Guidelines. And Congress cannot sentence individuals. That is why we set
up the framework that we did.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Kopf, do you want to respond?
JUDGE KOPF: The goat passes.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Okay.
Well, let us take an example of what Congress wants. Congress wants a
one hundred-to-one sentencing ratio for crack-to-powder cocaine. What do
we do with a one hundred-to-one sentencing ratio after Booker? Judge
Kopf, how about we start with you?
JUDGE KOPF: If it were up to me, I would use a different ratio.
Twenty-to-one is the last iteration of what the Commission suggested was
appropriate. But it is absolutely clear that Congress rejected that.
I agree that there may be circumstances in a crack case that may be
idiosyncratic, but, generally speaking, to reject the ratio categorically is
simply to tell Congress to go to hell. If you want to do that, fine, but be up-
front and say what you are doing.
JUDGE GERTNER: I agree with you.
JUDGE KOPF: Well, let me conclude, and then maybe you will not.
JUDGE GERTNER: I am just so excited.
JUDGE KOPF: As am I.
[Laughter]
16. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. 488 U.S. 361.
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But that is not what happens. No one sits down and says, "Screw you,
Congress, I am not enforcing this." There is always reference to some
higher abstract principles, when the abstract principles have, for whatever
good or bad reason, been rejected.
I think the question has been answered by Congress. I think they are
wrong, but they are not irrational; that is to say, they are not crazy.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We are going to let Judge Adelman speak
because he has written on the matter.
JUDGE ADELMAN: I think I was actually the first judge in the country
to impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on the disparity between crack
and powder and the way crack is treated. I do not think any reasonable
person would disagree that there is no reasonable basis for the distinction
between the way the Guidelines treat crack and powder. I do not think
anybody would disagree that it has huge implications for racial disparity.
So here is a case where-
JUDGE KOPF: Judge Adelman, are you saying that the crack guidelines
are irrational in the legal sense of that word?
JUDGE ADELMAN: Well, "legal" is a slippery word. Judge Lynch
was talking about slippery words.
JUDGE KOPF: But are you saying it is unconstitutional because, even
apart from the race angle, it is irrational?
JUDGE ADELMAN: No. I think courts have ruled to the contrary.
Courts have said that the different legal treatment between crack and
powder does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. I am using the word
"rationality" in its ordinary sense, rather than its legal sense.
The Sentencing Commission has said that the one hundred-to-one
distinction between powder and crack makes no sense. It went to Congress,
and Congress said-I think it failed by six votes-"we are not going to
change it."
I do not think that binds me. There are two different kinds of situations.
One is a mandatory minimum; there Congress has passed a law, and I am
bound by that. No doubt about it, I have got to follow it, whatever I think
of it.
But Congress has not passed any law; they rejected a recommendation
from the Commission. I do not have to follow a sort of vague legislative
intent. I do not think the fact that Congress turned down the Commission
binds me. The Guidelines are advisory, so I do not have to follow them.
There is no statute that says that I am stuck with this one hundred-to-one
distinction, except if there is a mandatory minimum. Therefore, I think I
am not bound by it.
There are a couple of cases. Recently, the First Circuit has said to the
contrary,18 and also the Fourth Circuit. 19 But I think those decisions, if you
read them, are really badly analyzed.
18. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
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JUDGE GERTNER: I do not agree with that.
JUDGE ADELMAN: All right.
But since when do I have to follow something that is not a law? I only
have to follow Congress's laws, that is all. If Congress has not enacted a
law, my responsibility is to follow the § 3553(a) factors.
Nobody in their right mind thinks that the Guidelines are reasonable on
this point.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Lynch.
JUDGE LYNCH: For me, this is the hardest question. I think we should
not be distracted by it in the sense of thinking that this is a typical question
about the post-Booker world. This is an atypical question.
To me it is hard for several reasons. I do not think that it is a good idea
for some judges to say, "We are just not going to follow this particular
guideline," because the problem is that other judges will take a different
view. Then we will have identical defendants being sentenced very
differently based on different judges' beliefs about drug sentences. I do not
think that is what is going on in the post-Booker world, and I do not think
that should be going on.
There is a problem, though. I do not know that I would use the word
"irrational," but I would use the word "evil." Under the mandatory
Guidelines, I have imposed many sentences that, if I were given the godlike
power that judges used to have, I would not have imposed. They were not
sentences that in my heart of hearts I think represent the best version of
justice. But they were not nuts-they were not "irrational," in Judge
Kopf s words-and they were not ultimately evil. I may think they do not
lead to good public policy, I may think they hurt more than they help, but
reasonable people can differ about that.
The crack ratio is something that I think goes beyond this, because it is so
far beyond what is reasonable. I think reasonable people can conclude that
there are a variety of social reasons why crack should be treated more
seriously than powder, but at the one hundred-to-one ratio, you are talking
about sentences that inflict enormous harm beyond any justification.
Some young man who was in the Justice Department was quoted in the
early days of the Bush Administration in the New York Times as essentially
saying, yes, people talk about this 100:1 ratio. That is a liberal red herring.
It is wrong, because the sentences are not 100:1. That ratio treats one gram
of crack as a hundred grams of powder, but that does not mean the sentence
is a hundred times as great. It is only five times as great. What are they
complaining about?20 If you know what powder sentences are like and then
you multiply them by five, well, that fellow should get that kind of sentence
for callously trivializing these enormous sentencing disparities.
19. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006).
20. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Department Opposes Lower Jail Terms for Crack, N.Y.
Times (Late Edition), Mar. 20, 2002, at A5.
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It does have a profound racial impact. The drug trade is like many illegal
activities. The gangs that get involved in these things are often ethnically
organized because people trust people who are like them. And sure enough,
it turns out that different kinds of people, different ethnic groups, find
themselves in control of particular distribution networks. The consequence
is that African-Americans are sentenced disproportionately more heavily
because of crack. These are people who, in terms of their role in the drug
trade, are identical, selling what is actually the same chemical, getting
vastly different treatment under the statutes and Guidelines.
We are not here to talk about equal protection analysis, but to me this is
just reckless indifference to that kind of disparity, and Congress is afraid to
look like it is softening on anything. The result is that we have sentences
that go beyond unjust in this area, and I find it very offensive.
Sorry for the editorial. Let me get back to what I have to do. I do not
believe judges post-Booker are supposed to just categorically reject the
Sentencing Commission's policy about any particular crime. But that is the
problem. I think this is the one place where a lot of judges really do feel a
pull to just say, "We are not going to do it." I am sure you could not find
five like that.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We have one right here.
JUDGE LYNCH: No, no, I am not talking about judges. I mean you
could not find five areas, five guidelines, five rules, five sentencing issues
where judges will be strongly tempted to just ignore or reject a Guidelines
position across the board. Maybe you could not find three, and I am not
sure I can quickly come up with another one.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I have got another coming up, but Judge
Presnell wants to speak.
JUDGE PRESNELL: Well, I think it is important for those who are not
in the process-particularly the law students-to understand how this really
works.
If you read my Williams21 opinion, we have a young, twenty-something-
year-old black kid who is a petty powder cocaine dealer. He has been
through the state system three or four times and he has served a total of
three years in prison. The state says, "Look, our state laws are not tough
enough. We are going to turn him over to the feds." So the feds go out and
they get an undercover agent and they decide, "Look, we can only get him
for maybe seven or eight years on powder, so we are just going to set him
up with crack." They send the undercover agent in, and he buys some
crack, he goes back, and they keep buying until they have the amount they
need to get the sentence they want. That is the way it works from the
prosecutorial standpoint.
I included a footnote in my opinion that just recognizes the disparity and
the political concern about the racial implications. I did not say it was the
21. United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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basis for my opinion, but the U.S. Attorney has used that as one of the
arguments on appeal. The case is before the Eleventh Circuit now.
But powder cocaine and crack cocaine are the same chemical substance.
I do not see how you get that disparity, either. We keep using this word
"departure," and we should not, because we are not departing now; we are
sentencing pursuant to the 3553(a) factors.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Okay. The second one I have is illegal reentry
cases. Illegal reentry cases under the PROTECT Act authorize the
Department of Justice to set up what are called fast-track departures. 22
Certain districts have fast-track departures, which result in a four-level
reduction if there is quick cooperation. But other districts do not have fast-
track departure. I think we do not have a fast-track departure district in
New York. Do you have one?
JUDGE KOPF: We are.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Nebraska is one.
JUDGE GERTNER: We are not technically one, but we are de facto
one.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So the question is, under Booker, how does a
district become a de facto fast-track departure system?
JUDGE GERTNER: Well, I will tell you. This is another issue with
"compliance." There is someone who is picked up for illegal reentry after
deportation. All of a sudden, you get a request from both sides, the
government and the defense, to have a sentencing without a presentence
report. The person is then sentenced without a presentence report. The
defense asks for time served. The government stands mute. Time served is
way below what the Guidelines would otherwise identify.
I am having a battle over the Massachusetts statistics. When I looked at
our Booker departures, at what was in that category, there were eighteen or
twenty cases where clearly the government and the defense were getting
together to get these people out of the country and deported. So there are de
facto fast tracks around the country.
A good deal of the criticism about the post-Booker world is that there are
regional disparities. It is not clear to me that the regional disparities are any
different than they were before. It also makes an enormous difference on
your docket. If you have lots of small cases and are overwhelmed with
immigration cases, there are certain pressures on your docket. It does not
make sense that in a post-Booker world we would recognize those regional
differences, those regional pressures, with respect to some issues but not
with respect to others.
In Massachusetts we are overwhelmed with street crime, but virtually no
white-collar crime. As a result, the prosecution has a lower rate of
cooperation departures than anywhere else in the country. Small wonder.
22. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(b), 117 Stat. 650, 674 (2003).
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These cases are so small there is no one to cooperate against. If the Booker
variance rate is high, it is because these small cases, individuals on a street
comer with crack, test the Guidelines more than anything else.
So the question of regional disparity, if people are serious about it, would
essentially wipe out the fast-track program. But I think maybe we should
be attentive to regional pressures. Gun charges look different in New York
than they do elsewhere in the country.
Within a broader framework of a national system, I am suggesting
variations around the kind of anchoring phenomenon that Judge Lynch
talked about. Variations on a theme will not bring us back to the pre-
Guidelines world. They will be variations on a theme, as opposed to wild
swings from one end of the country to the other.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Did you want to speak about the fast track,
Judge Adelman?
JUDGE ADELMAN: Well, let me just make a related point. The fast
track has to do with imposing a lower sentence on somebody who enters the
country after being deported and committing a felony. The idea of fast
track is some districts allow lower sentences, so judges in other districts
have been lowering their sentences out of the disparity theory.
I actually think there is a more important issue in the illegal reentry cases
and that this other issue illustrates something that nobody talks about very
much now.
There is a sixteen-level enhancement to the Guidelines for certain
aggravated felonies, so the sentence goes way, way up. If you do any kind
of research into how that sixteen-level enhancement got passed, basically it
was the Sentencing Commission.
Somebody made a motion-you know, I used to be in the legislature; I
know how these things happen. There was not any long study, there was
not any sort of "here is the reason, here are the problems, here are the
statistics." It was just "here is a motion. How about sixteen levels?"
That is about how the one hundred-to-one crack ratio happened, too. It
came about after the Len Bias case-the basketball player.23 So this is how
things sometimes get enacted, both in the legislature and in the Sentencing
Commission.
I did some opinions regarding the fast track. But in those opinions I also
talked about-and nobody has really picked up on this, which is way more
interesting to me than the disparity issue-the lack of basis for this sixteen-
level enhancement.
I think that is important because if you study the Guidelines, you see that
we do not really know much about how the Sentencing Commission chose
the numbers. It was all private. It was not reviewed, as Judge Gertner said
23. See generally WashingtonPost.com, The Len Bias Tragedy,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/longterm/memories/bias/launchbiasfnt.htm
(last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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earlier, by any judge; it was not reviewed by Congress. It was not reviewed
by anybody.
I think that it is important now, in this new post-Booker world, to talk
about whether the particular numbers in particular Guidelines are rational,
and to criticize and scrutinize them, because the problem is that we are
dealing with the Guidelines like they are the Ten Commandments. Even
when they are advisory, they still have this sort of aura-everybody
measures everything against the Guidelines.
The Guidelines themselves have not really been scrutinized, and now
under this new regime they can be. So I would make a pitch for that.
JUDGE LYNCH: Could I just make a point? There are a lot of people
who I see in the audience who know what all these words mean, but there
are also a lot of law students. It is probably useful to just clarify a couple of
things.
First, you should know what sixteen levels means. If you go up two
levels, that is typically a twenty-five percent increase in sentence; another
two levels, another twenty-five percent above that, and so on.
JUDGE PRESNELL: Plus the base for this crime is eight.
JUDGE LYNCH: Yes, so sixteen levels is a huge jump.
Second, what is the jump for? It is a crime to reenter the country after
you have been deported; that is the basic crime. But it is a more serious
crime, and there is a separate statutory maximum that also gives you this
Guidelines enhancement, if you reenter the country after having been
deported for what is called an "aggravated felony." That sounds pretty
reasonable until you realize that an aggravated felony does not have to be
aggravated, and it does not have to be a felony. It just has to be on this big
long list, and Congress and the Commission have periodically added to the
list. The list is somewhere else in the immigration laws, and Congress
keeps throwing things in it, and it is incorporated by reference into the
Guidelines.
The thing to understand about fast track, when people talk about what
happens in different districts, is that it is a Justice Department program; it is
a government-sponsored program. The government asks for these
departures, the prosecutor asks for these departures, in particular districts.
Most of those districts are along the southern rim of the country, but not all
of them.
I was surprised when I found out that Nebraska was one. I did not find
out today. I found out because one of my students at Columbia did some
research into the fast-track program. I learned a lot of things I did not know
before. For example, I thought there was one fast-track program, and if the
local U.S. Attorney petitioned the Justice Department, you could have it in
your district if they thought it was appropriate. But that is not so. In fact,
there are lots of different fast-track programs in lots of different districts,
and they are all different. In some places you get four levels, in some you
get one, in some you get two, and it has a lot to do with what it takes to get
enough guilty pleas to clear the dockets and stop using so many government
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resources. So it is quite a remarkable little piece of disparity in its own
right.
I do want to raise, though, one bigger issue about regional disparity. I am
for regional disparity. I think one of the foolishnesses of the Guidelines is
the notion that because we are one federal system, we are one sovereignty,
the United States of America, everybody in the country should be
sentencing in the same way.
I said before, and I mean it, that I think it is a terrible idea that I should
give radically different sentences than the judge in the next courtroom. I
am not sure it is so odd or wrong that I should give somewhat different
sentences than a federal judge in Texas. They have a different culture and
they have different social problems than we do. There is also the simple
fact that they sit in different states than we do. Another piece of disparity
that we do not often talk about is the disparity between the federal sentence
and the state sentence for the same kind of criminal behavior. As Judge
Presnell said, people get put in the federal system because somebody
decided to put them there. Some prosecutor decided that this guy should be
prosecuted federally, not necessarily because they were out to get him or
because they thought he was a bad guy. Maybe they were investigating his
neighborhood or they were investigating his organization, and some poor
schlub who is selling drugs for that organization is suddenly a federal
offender and is going to get the federal sentence, while somebody who is in
the state system gets a different sentence.
Here is an example from right here in the Southern District of New York:
You may have heard or read that the Manhattan District Attorney has
considered himself from time to time a rival of the United States Attorney.
There is not a lot of cooperation there. In the Bronx, however, there is a lot
of cooperation. That means that if you are a felon in possession of a firearm
and you happen to be on the east side of the Harlem River, you are very
likely to be turned over to the feds and you will get a very severe sentence.
If you are on the west side of the Harlem River in Manhattan doing the
same thing, you will be prosecuted in the state system and get a very
different sentence. That is a piece of disparity that neither the judges nor
the Sentencing Commission have any control over. But when we are
sentencing a drug or gun offender, should it not be relevant what happens to
similar offenders in the state where we are sitting? If he were in the state
court across the street, is he going to get the same severe sentence as he is
in federal court or is he going to be treated much more leniently?
There really are significant differences in the way different kinds of
crimes are treated around the country. I do not know why that is
necessarily so terrible. Along a border, they have a lot of these immigration
cases, and they probably are different from the ones that we get. They may
have people who just got back over the border or people who are part of a
community that is always moving back and forth across the border. It is a
different story than the same crime by people in New York or in Chicago,
who are usually caught because they have been arrested for some other
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crime. I am not arguing that we ought to be so severe on illegal immigrants
necessarily. I am just saying there is a different story here than there is in
Brownsville, Texas.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That issue of state-federal disparity is discussed
in one of Judge Adelman's opinions.24
Judge Gertner.
JUDGE GERTNER: I have a stark example of that. I just finished a
case that could have been a potential death penalty case. Two gangs were
shooting at each other. One was prosecuted as a RICO case in federal
court, subject to the death penalty, but the gang at which they were
shooting, who were shooting back, was being prosecuted in the state court,
for which there was no death penalty.
It was even worse than that. All federal jurisdictions wind up taking
juries from largely suburban areas-not in New York so much, but
certainly the Eastern District of Massachusetts has seven percent people of
color. If the same crime was tried across the street, there would have been
twenty to thirty percent people of color on the jury. So there was a prospect
of trying a death penalty case to a largely white or all-white jury based on
the decision of the prosecutor. I think that this is part of what the
discussion should be, because when you talk about disparity you really do
have to talk about all the players in disparity, rather than controlling just
one player.
As one of my colleagues once said, discretion is hydraulic; if you control
one person, it flows to someone else. One of the issues that occurred under
the mandatory Guidelines was that judges lost their discretion, and it was
then mightily transferred to the prosecutor, under very different terms.
There is also a disparity that comes from different state systems.
Massachusetts is not a Guidelines state, so I am often asked to interpret
sentences that were administered in a non-Guidelines state and plug them
into the Guidelines. So, for example, there is sort of a community
alternative here, called "continued without a finding." It is done all
throughout the Massachusetts courts. It is a way of getting someone under
the supervision of the court without a guilty plea. The Guidelines treat that
as a conviction, and treat it very seriously. The state judge that imposed it
surely did not.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Kopf, do you have a comment?
JUDGE KOPF: What you are hearing is the degree to which judges view
their ability to develop a coherent methodology of sentencing. Some
people, God bless them, think that they have that ability, and others do not.
My question to the panelists would be this: Now that you have raised all
these problems, what are you going to do-what is your response to this?
In individual cases, you are going to write opinions to explain why it is you
are doing something. What does that do for the rest of the country? And
24. United States v. Wachowiak, 412 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
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why is it that we care? Why is it that we want Judge Lynch to tell us what
is evil? Why is it up to him to decide that the crack Guidelines are evil?
Why do we want an unelected judge to derive his own categories of evil?
I think that question, prompted by Booker, compels us to have this
wonderful debate about role. Wherever you come down on this, ultimately
the question that it asks district judges to answer is, what is our role? It is a
profound and difficult question.
